

Pasts and Futures of Economic Sociology

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Over the past few decades, economic sociology has moved from tight symbiosis with mainstream economics toward the construction of alternative explanations for economic activities. That move has allied economic sociologists increasingly with both innovative work inside economics and new analytic enterprises outside. Cumulatively, these developments have created a much more social interpretation of money and markets.

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Economic sociology has gone through astonishing changes in the past 25 years. From a simultaneous critique of and complement to neoclassical economics, it has become a rich, self-sustaining field. It has begun to generate or incorporate serious alternatives to neoclassical economics. These changes have deeply affected my own attitude toward, and relationship to, economic sociology.

In fact, a funny thing happened to me on the way to economic sociology. For my entire career, I have worked on different economic processes, with books on how life insurance became acceptable, on the valuation of children, on interpersonal monetary practices, and more recently on the economy of intimate social relations, as well as shorter forays into such eminently economic topics as consumption and children's work. For years, no one, including me, called what I was doing economic sociology.

In a peculiar sense, they were right. The economic sociology that was growing up 20 to 25 years ago clung closely to mainstream economics, either extending its main ideas to ostensibly more sociological subjects, or identifying social contexts that constrained economic activity—still mostly assumed to behave according to precepts of neoclassical economics. It dealt almost exclusively with firms and markets, those favorite subjects of economists. It concentrated on what we can call extension and context accounts.

Extension theorists applied relatively standard economic models to apparently noneconomic processes, like religious congregations, household behavior, or professional sports teams. Context analysts looked at standard economic phenomena, such as labor markets, commodity markets, or corporations, showing how social organization as context shaped the options of economic actors. Advocates of context

Author's Note: I have adapted a few passages from Zelizer (2005a).

spoke of the “embeddedness” of economic phenomena in social processes and often referred to interpersonal networks as they did so. This context approach made the implicit assumption that economists had gotten some phenomenon, such as bargaining or price setting, right. What was missing, according to the economic sociologists? Economists, argued context theorists, had neglected the cultural and social context that mattered, such as previously existing connections among potential economic partners.

Over the past 10 to 15 years, I have been surprised as anyone else to see myself become part of the economic sociology establishment, which is why you see me joining this symposium. What happened? Part of it is that I learned more about the variety of work going on in economic sociology and took a greater part in that increasingly energetic conversation. Three changes in my relation to the field made a big difference:

1. To my surprise, intellectual organizers of the field such as Richard Swedberg, Harrison White, and Neil Smelser started pointing to my work as an example of a new current within the field.
2. I found myself teaching economic sociology to expanding circles of graduate and undergraduate students alike.
3. The first two changes forced me to confront major premises of mainline economic sociology more directly than in the days when I thought of myself primarily as a student of American history and culture.

Instead of firms and markets alone, it seemed to me that all forms of production, consumption, distribution, and transfers of assets deserved attention from economic sociologists, including me.

This article therefore necessarily mixes an intellectual autobiography with a critical survey of past, present, and future changes in a fast-moving field. I begin with a summary of long-term shifts in the study of economic processes at large. Next comes a closer look at newly prominent emphases within economic sociology and a discussion of how those emphases undermine previously dominant presumptions concerning intersections between economic life and interpersonal relations. I illustrate these points extensively by means of recent analyses, including my own, of money. The article closes with a quick survey of other trends within the field.

Economic Processes Reassessed

Economic sociology does not stand alone in its challenge to standard understandings of economic processes. Whereas big changes did occur within the field, similar transformations took place elsewhere. Three of those changes deserve special attention. First of all, change occurred within economics itself. Such currents as

behavioral economics, feminist economics, organizational economics, institutional economics, household dynamics, and, more recently, neuroeconomics, mounted their own critiques of neoclassical models.

These new forms of economics all started to create alternative accounts of economic processes, including the range of interpersonal relations on which I had been concentrating for many years. Something so simple as the introduction of game theory into household bargaining models, for example, substituted a set of interactions among players for the single preference-bound choices of earlier models.

Second, outside of economics, critics of law and economics, organization theorists, students of inequality, and critical feminists contributed to our thinking about how economic and social processes actually work. They, too, insisted on power, bargaining, and interpersonal transactions.

Third, at the edge of economics and sociology, a number of new, hybrid disciplines emerged to propose their own versions of economic processes. They included socioeconomics, communitarian economics, the French *économie solidaire et sociale*, and world systems analysis.

At the same time, economic sociologists not only grew in number and confidence but also moved away increasingly from extension and context accounts towards the formulation of truly alternative, socially based description and explanation of economic activity. (An impressively energetic parallel surge has occurred within French social science.¹) This alternative analysis attempted to identify social processes and social relations at the very heart of economic activity, including the previously sacred and unexplored territory of markets themselves. Many of these analysts rallied to Harrison White's declaration that markets were deeply social creations rather than autonomous arenas on which social processes merely impinged.

Indeed, during his later years Pierre Bourdieu was moving in the same direction. In the 2000 version of his *Structures sociales de l'économie*, he declared,

Attempts to "correct" the errors or omissions of a paradigm without challenging the paradigm itself . . . remind me of Tycho Brahe's heroic efforts to save Ptolemy's geocentric model from the Copernican revolution. (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 12, fn. 1)

In general, sociological seekers after an alternative economic sociology criticized the idea of embeddedness, which implied that social processes supplied the economy's shell, but the shell's real contents consisted of economics' rational exchange systems. Just as institutional economists, shocked by the failure of markets alone to transform postsocialist economies, were beginning to portray economic activities as social processes, economic sociologists were venturing into the cores of firms, markets, organizations, and financial institutions.

Through these changes, I found that my own concentration on meaningful interpersonal aspects of economic activity no longer stood at the periphery of what was going on. Now, from the inside, I can see more clearly that the process of expansion

continues. As one sign, browse the table of contents in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg's (2005) second edition of their *Handbook of Economic Sociology*. It prominently features new institutionalism, emotions, behavioral economics, and law, all subjects absent from the first edition's table of contents only 11 years earlier.

Even more is going on in and around economic sociology. New topics and emphases include:

- *Multiple markets*: From an earlier almost exclusive focus on production, economic sociologists are now expanding their analysis into other markets, especially financial markets, consumption markets, markets for personal care, and what they loosely call the informal economy.
- *Culture of firms*: Economic sociologists are finally shedding their structural armor and studying how the meaningful content of social ties shapes transactions and alignments within firms.
- *The production and reproduction of inequality, notably gender inequality*: Economic sociologists increasingly challenge status attainment models that account for inequalities as results of encounters between biased market selection and attributes of individuals.
- *Households as intense sites of economic activity*: Here economic sociologists, along with their allies in economics and anthropology, not only identify extensive, consequential production, consumption, distribution, and transfers of assets but also interaction patterns that defy representation as short-term spot markets.

My recent work shows the influence of all these innovations, especially analyses of multiple markets and of households. My 2005 book *The Purchase of Intimacy*, for example, looked hard at how both everyday practices and American law manage the intersection of intimate interpersonal relations and economic activity (Zelizer, 2005b). In couples, households, and provision of personal care, the book shows, participants work hard to find appropriate matches between relations and economic transactions. Showing how those matching processes worked engaged me inevitably in criticism of widespread misconceptions concerning the interactions of personal relations and economic activity (Zelizer, 2005a).

Most important, from my perspective, is the attack on a common presumption among economists and sociologists alike: what I call the twinned stories of separate spheres and hostile worlds. With separate spheres, we have the assumption that there are distinct arenas for rational economic activity and for personal relations, one a sphere of calculation and efficiency, the other a sphere of sentiment and solidarity. The companion doctrine of hostile worlds declares that contamination and disorder result from close contact between the spheres: Economic rationality corrupts intimacy, and intimate relations hinder efficiency.

Challenging this false boundary matters. Why? Because the boundary perpetuates damaging divisions between ostensibly "real," consequential market activity and peripheral, trivial, economies. More specifically, the dichotomy between serious

economic phenomena, such as firms, corporations, or financial markets, and supposedly inconsequential, sentimental economies, such as households, micro-credits, local money communities, immigrant roscas (rotating savings and credit associations), pawning, gifts, or remittances. The real economy, in this mythology, consists only of market-mediated transactions, just as “real” money consists of a single, homogeneous, fungible legal tender.

What is wrong with this view? Among other failings, it ignores that collectively such supposedly minor transactions are not trivial. They have large macroeconomic consequences, for example in generating large flows of remittances from rich countries to poor countries, and in transmitting wealth from one generation to the next. As intergenerational transmission of wealth illustrates, furthermore, intimate transactions also create or sustain large-scale inequalities by class, race, ethnicity, and even gender. More generally, the separate spheres/hostile worlds doctrine perpetuates the context-oriented belief that economic activities follow their own laws, for which social relations simply supply constraints.

Uncomfortable with such dualisms and eager to put forward single-principle accounts of social life, opponents of hostile worlds views have now and then countered with reductionist “nothing-but” arguments: the ostensibly separate world of personal relations, they argue, is nothing but a special case of some general principle. Nothing-but advocates divide among three principles: nothing but economic rationality, nothing but culture, and nothing but politics. Thus, for economic reductionists, personal relations of caring, friendship, sexuality, or parent-child ties become special cases of advantage-seeking individual choice under conditions of constraint—in short, of economic rationality. For cultural reductionists, such phenomena become expressions of distinct beliefs. Others insist on the political, coercive, and exploitative bases of the same phenomena.

Even those economic sociologists who avoid nothing-but reductionism, unfortunately, continue to adopt an attenuated variety of the separate spheres/hostile worlds conception, for example by distinguishing more and less market-like transactions rather than recognizing that every market depends on continuously negotiated meaningful interpersonal relations. Nevertheless, in general, economic sociology is moving away from extension, context, and separate spheres/hostile worlds reasoning toward a more fully social conception of economic activity.

The Case of Money

We can see these changes clearly in the sociological study of money. Marx, Weber, Simmel, Simiand, and Mauss all made influential statements about money. But for much of the 20th century, the study of money became the monopoly of economists, with other social scientists regarding money as a sort of economic intrusion—often dangerous—into social life (see, e.g., Habermas, 1989). The prevailing

economic view absolutized a market conception of money as operating in its own morally neutral sphere with autonomous laws, independently from social relations. Even Talcott Parsons's (1967, p. 358) analysis of money as a symbolic language restricted money's symbolism to the economic domain. Indeed, in 1979, Randall Collins complained that sociologists ignored money "as if it were not sociological enough" (p. 190).

Since the 1980s, however, North American, British, and European scholars have restarted the social interpretation of money. They have asked a set of questions that echo the questions posed about economic processes more generally. Is money indeed an abstract phenomenon with autonomous laws? Does social life provide context for monetary transactions? How does that context constrain money? How vulnerable are social relations to the allegedly corrupting impact of money? Or is money itself constituted by social ties and therefore a social process and product? Is there a single money or multiple monies?

Many recent analysts have contributed to that debate.² Significantly, whereas the first edition of Smelser and Swedberg's *Handbook of Economic Sociology* included a single essay on "Money, Banking, and Financial Markets," the 2005 edition split the topic in two: banking and financial markets in one chapter, money and credit in another.

These developments shaped my own work. My 1994 book *The Social Meaning of Money* challenged classical theories that treated money exclusively as an impersonal neutral medium of economic exchange suitable for the rationalized market-driven contemporary world. It also challenged the more ominous prediction that money inevitably undermined meaningful social ties, reducing interpersonal connections to instrumental calculation. To do so, *The Social Meaning of Money* followed changes in U.S. social practices with the expansion of monetary transactions.

Focusing on the period roughly between 1870s and 1930s, the book explored these processes in a variety of settings: households, the gift economy, and welfare transactions. It showed that monetization did indeed present Americans with new challenges. But it also documented that instead of turning away from money or letting their social relations wither in the headlong pursuit of money, Americans actually incorporated money into their construction of new social ties and transformed money's meaning as they did so. More specifically, as money entered the household, gift exchanges, and charitable donations, individuals and organizations invented an extensive array of currencies, ranging from housekeeping allowances, pin money, and spending money to money gifts, gift certificates, remittances, tips, mother's pensions, and food stamps.

How do people actually implement the multiple distinctions the book described? Here is one recurrent pattern that shows across all the book's materials. In each case people employ a set of practices we can call earmarking: treatments of money that signal the nature of the relationship between the parties to a particular kind of transaction.

Techniques of earmarking include three main varieties:

1. Establishing social practices that sort otherwise identical media into distinct categories. Depending on how it is used, when, and most importantly for what type of social relation, the same physically indistinguishable medium (e.g., dollar or a euro) can serve as a wage, a bonus, a tip, a gift, an allowance, charity, or a remittance. Each calls for a different set of routines representing its character.
2. Creation of segmented media in the form of tokens, coupons, scrip, chits, food stamps, affinity credit cards, local currencies, money orders, vouchers, or gift certificates, which are appropriate for restricted sets of relations and transfers, and in many cases are not legal tender within the larger economy.
3. Transformation of selected objects into monetary media, as with cigarettes, postage stamps, subway tokens, poker chips, or baseball cards.

This is where I left the problem in 1994. Although it received respectful reviews, my book had less impact than I had hoped on general discussions of monetary processes. That happened in part because the book concentrated on small-scale social relations and avoided polemics with theorists except for objections to different versions of the “money corrupts” doctrine.

But there is a more fundamental reason for why it took a long time for the book to have an impact. In their preface to the French edition of *Social Meaning*, Jérôme Bourdieu and Johan Heilbron astutely noted that superficial reading of the book

runs the risk of reinforcing the propensity to think of sociological analysis, especially its culturalist versions, as placing economic phenomena in a second dimension, and concentrating on marginal phenomena, providing exotic sidelights that fail to touch the real things of the genuine economy. (Bourdieu & Heilbron, 2005, p. 14)

Heilbron and Bourdieu are right. More than I realized as I wrote the book, it is easy for careless or hostile readers to dismiss the book as irrelevant to their concerns on two grounds: that it focuses on marginal monetary phenomena, not “real” money, and that it is an essentially culturalist explanation, rich in trimmings but not in serious substance.

One can see why this impression occurs: The book does concentrate on small-scale processes rather than macro-monetary transformations. It studies family, gift, and welfare economies, and it explores monetary meanings. Given the long-standing propensity to divide the economic world between, on one side, the serious, “real” markets of corporations and finance dealing with “real” money and, on the other side, allegedly minor, marginal economies with their “quasi” imperfect monies, the book does not seem to take on crucial economic sites. If you believe that the real economy consists only of market-mediated transactions and the serious business of money takes place only within corporations or finance, it is easier to consider the materials of the book as irrelevant.

Finally, for understandable reasons, I set the book out against standard views of commodification: of money as a rationalizing force that transformed social relations wherever it went. Intent on showing the failure of such arguments I did not highlight sufficiently what was distinctive about the alternative I proposed. As a result, I let some readers read the book's main message thus: "Money is more cultural than traditional thinkers allowed."

However, as Bourdieu and Heilbron (2005) pointed out, such conclusions are wrong. They are wrong on several grounds:

First, the central insight of the book is not that money is cultural: Its most distinctive contribution is attaching monetary practices to social relations, and that is something that is simply not on the screen of most social science analyses of money.

Second, and more specifically, the book argues that people regularly differentiate forms of monetary transfers in correspondence with their definitions of the sort of relationship that exists between them. They adopt symbols, rituals, practices, accounting systems, and physically distinguishable forms of money to mark distinct social relations.

Third, people work hard to maintain such distinctions: They care greatly about differentiating monies because payment systems are a powerful way in which they mark apart different social ties. Each of these ties has a different quality and each one therefore calls for different forms and rituals of payment.

It happens that relations, in my conception, are not the thin, flat relations of network analysis but the rich relations of ethnography. Ethnography reveals a great deal of negotiation of meaning and the actual production of cultural meaning. This is not a trivial feature of money. As Bourdieu and Heilbron (2005) said, that is how money works.

Relational work and earmarking are general, crucial features of money. In this view, culture is not an abstract entity. People create culture relationally. The earmarking of money raises just that issue: Earmarking is a relational practice. People do not just adopt categories from the surrounding culture. They negotiate their social lives, earmarking monies for different sets of relations.

These days, I would state the book's main themes more polemically. Here, for example, is an obvious point I took for granted but did not dramatize sufficiently: Monetary phenomena consist of and depend on social practices. We cannot simply treat money as the volume and flow of transactions within accounting systems and such tokens of those systems as banknotes, coins, and credits. By treating consumption, distribution, and transfers of assets as market-mediated processes, analysts abstract away the concrete social relations and practices that constitute and drive consumption, distribution, and transfers of assets.

Controversies and Convergences

Several years after its publication, the book's concentration on personal ties and practices therefore set me on a collision course with other theorists. Critics such as

Ben Fine and Costas Lapavistas (2000) and Geoffrey Ingham (2001) insisted on the generalizing, power-backed process of money (see also Lapavistas, 2005). They even raised doubts that the transactions I was analyzing were truly monetary.

For example, Fine and Lapavistas (2000) found disturbing my emphasis on heterogeneity, in particular my apparent disregard for money's "homogenizing influence" (p. 22). They conceded that "it is the dual nature of money that must always be emphasized—universal and homogenized money creates scope for expressing relations that are socially and culturally specific" (p. 22). Yet money's socially bound variations, within Fine and Lapavistas' framework, struggle feebly against its universalizing tendencies. "The broader aspects and meaning of social relations that are expressed through money," Fine and Lapavistas told us, "find themselves trapped within the featurelessness of universal exchangeability" (p. 15). Thus, Fine and Lapavistas insist both on a universal money and on the causal priority of money's utter fungibility. "There is one money," they asserted, "even though it assumes different forms" (p. 29).

Although certainly aware of the social dimensions of money, such critics cling to a safer contextual approach, which concedes the significance of social constraints on money but ignores its relational basis. As a result, this view perpetuates the separate spheres model of economic and social life. The "one" money is the real thing: Other monies, within this model, remain "quasi" approximations.

In the current debate, economic sociologists are making a serious effort to go beyond both critiques of economic analysis as well as contextual interpretations, studying instead the actual social processes which constitute money. As Bruce Carruthers (2005) has recently pointed out, that trend has already gone far in both in the analysis of money and of its twin, credit. In the process, current studies are replacing the classical view of modern money as a single, homogeneous, liquid medium for economic exchange with a continuum involving a wide variety of monetary media.

Consider Nigel Dodd's (2005) able mapping of money's plurality. Dodd challenged the outdated dichotomy between "real money" and what he called "emaciated monies" and others often label as "quasi-monies." As he introduced money's variation, Dodd proposed an admirable research agenda: explaining differences among kinds of monies, as well as identifying the "different causal trajectories involved in the emergence of new forms of money."

Dodd's analysis of variation in the forms of money helps construct better answers to what he identified as a significant contemporary paradox: the simultaneous increase in homogenization of state-issued currency and diversification of monies. More specifically, he used his analytical tools to identify what he sees as the euro's "hybrid" nature. He rightly portrayed the euro as a striking instance of a recurrent process in which homogenization of currency stimulates diversification of money—diversification, that is, through the multiplication of both noncurrency monetary media and units of account. Dodd's approach thus shares in the healthy trend within

economic sociology, as scholars increasingly liberate themselves from an earlier obsession with providing critique or context to conventional economic analysis.

Yet even Dodd fails to recognize the incorporation of social relations into monetary transactions and of monetary transactions into social relations. Such reluctant integration of money's social elements is not trivial. It led Dodd to omit two crucial, partly independent, elements in his analysis: money's relational differentiation and monetary practices. People regularly match forms of monetary transfers to the sort of relationship that obtains between the parties. As for practices, they rely on symbols, rituals, accounting systems, and varying monetary tokens to mark distinctive social ties.

Which media or unit of account people adopt, when, and how depends on the type of social relations involved. Parent-child, priest-congregant, welfare official-aid recipient, legislator-constituent, courting couple—all these relations sometimes involve monetary transactions, but each calls for a very different combination of media and units of account. As they calculate who owes what favors, services, tributes, and gifts to whom at both ends of a migration stream, participants in the complex relations of a remittance system often employ currencies of the sending and receiving countries as their media, but they typically create their own hybrid units of account

We must therefore take Dodd's analysis a step further. All moneys are actually dual; they serve both general and local circuits. Indeed, this duality applies to all economic transactions. Seen from the top, economic transactions connect with broad national symbolic meanings and institutions. Seen from the bottom, however, economic transactions are highly differentiated, personalized, and local, meaningful to particular relations. No contradiction therefore exists between uniformity and diversity: They are simply two different aspects of the same transaction. Just as people speak English in a recognizably grammatical way at the same time that they pour individual and personal content into their conversations, economic actors simultaneously adopt universalizing modes and particularizing markers.

Some recent analysts have gone at this first point in a somewhat different way by saying that money depends on accounting systems. I agree, but with a qualification: Accounting systems are not just top-down mechanisms of banks or states. People create and negotiate their own accounting systems on a smaller scale. They incorporate and shape social practices.

Traditional analysts are also wrong to dismiss households and other non-market-mediated economies and their monetary worlds as peripheral to the real economy. They are wrong because households, kinship groups, friendship networks, neighborhoods, and ostensibly noneconomic organizations such as churches and voluntary associations play significant parts in a wide range of economic activity. Take the obvious example of migrant remittance systems. They loom very large in the national economies of such countries as Turkey and Mexico, but—to the despair of many development economists—work chiefly through ties of kinship, friendship, and neighborhood rather than banks and other formal economic institutions.

Why did I choose to focus on families, welfare, and gifts? These are areas where, according to the traditional dichotomy between the market and personal relations, either money should not have entered at all or rationalization should have wrought the largest changes: homogenizing core personal and social relations and commodifying sentiment in family, friendship, charity, death. My research shows instead that it is very hard work to suppress the active creative power of supposedly vulnerable social relations.

Whither Economic Sociology?

Not all informed observers, to be sure, share my enthusiasm for current trends in economic sociology. Reviewing major compilations in the field, Rob Faulkner and Eric Cheney (2003) and Jesper Sørensen (2003) have offered precisely opposite criticisms of the field: Faulkner and Cheney declared that economic sociologists have excluded major fields of analysis, such as crime and the “dark side” of capitalism, that earlier sociologists handled quite effectively. Sørensen countered that the organizers of the field have become so inclusive they risk diluting the field’s intellectual content.

Each, as it happens, had a point. In their zeal to get institutional processes right, economic sociologists have spent little energy questioning the very existence of the institutions they study. And the expansion of subject matter I have been celebrating has reduced the field’s theoretical coherence as compared with the time when it operated chiefly as a close complement to mainstream economic theory. Yet we have grounds for thinking that new, more critical versions of economic sociology will emerge, and that new syntheses are in the making.

In my part of the field, in any case, I see students of economic processes taking three important, promising, if partly contradictory steps.

Step 1, as I suggested before, consists of abandoning separate spheres and hostile worlds arguments in favor of analyses following differentiated social ties with their distinctive accounting systems, media, economic transactions, meanings, and boundaries.

Step 2 involves questioning the attenuated version I likewise mentioned earlier, the idea that all spheres have economic activity but some are more market-like—more rational, more governed by impersonal efficiency than others, a condition that organizational analysts often describe as arms length transactions.

A very interesting third step partly contradicts the first two. As typified by Michel Callon (1998) and Donald MacKenzie and Yuval Millo (2003) we encounter the idea that economics has grown up around corporations and markets but by its very development has reshaped those corporations and markets in its own image. If theories actually shape relations and practices in that way, some areas of social life could, after all, become more “marketish” than others, through the performativity of theories applied to those areas.

If so, a new version of Step 2 could conceivably apply: If constructivists are right, it may be that some areas constructed by economic theory lend themselves to superior explanation by economic theory as compared with other areas such as households. In that case, economic sociologists would have to think seriously about fashioning theories that would simultaneously shape and explain other arenas of production, consumption, distribution, and asset transfers than the beloved capitalist firms and markets of the old economic sociology.

I am not declaring that performativity fills the future of economic sociology. I am saying instead that the presence of such intriguing ideas in a field that once clung closely to mainstream economics marks economic sociology as a vital, even visionary academic enterprise.

Notes

1. See, for example, *L'argent en famille* (2005), Boltanski and Chiapello (1999); Caillé (1994); Convert and Heilbron (2004), Cusin and Benamouzing (2004); De La Pradelle (1996); Gislain and Steiner (1995); Guérin (2003); Hassoun (2005); Saint-Jean and Steiner (2005); Sciardet (2003); Servet (1999); Servet and Guérin (2002); Steiner (1999, 2003); Wacquant (2002); Weber, Gojard, and Gramain (2003); Weber (2005).

2. See, for example, Aglietta and Orléan (2002); Akin and Robbins (1999); Baker (1987); Blanc (2000); Bloch (1994); Carruthers (2005); Carruthers and Espeland (1998); Cohen (2003); Dodd (1994, 2005); Fishman and Messina (2006); Gilbert (2005); Guyer (1995); Helleiner (2003); Ingham (2004); Keister (2002); Leyson and Thrift (1997); Mizruchi and Brewster Stearns (1994); Pahl (1989); Parry and Bloch (1989); Raineau (2004); Singh (1995); Woodruff (1999).

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